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Will Election Results Modify U.S. Foreign Policy?

WASHINGTON—The congressional elections of November 7 have created uncertainty in the Truman Administration as to whether the United States can continue to develop its present foreign policy intact. In a press conference on November 8 Secretary of State Dean Acheson said that no changes in policy impended. Yet the election victories of Republicans who based their campaigns on criticisms of the Administration's conduct of world affairs presage trouble for President Truman if he does not take some account of such sentiment.

The victories of four Democrats who staunchly upheld the Administration's foreign policy—Senators Herbert H. Lehman of New York, William Benton and Brien McMahon of Connecticut and Senator-elect Thomas C. Hennings of Missouri—refute the claim that the election outcome meant a nation-wide repudiation of this country's course in world affairs. While the vote leaves the Democrats in control of the Senate and House, the margin of 49 to 47 in the Senate is so narrow that the Administration will risk the defeat of all its foreign policy programs unless it seeks Republican support. The Administration, however, will not find it easy to determine the character of Republican opinion. Republicans do not agree among themselves. They range from supporters of an active policy of international cooperation like H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey and Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts to isolationists of the prewar type like Hugh A. Butler of Nebraska, George W. Malone of Nevada and William E. Jenner of Indiana. The victorious critics of foreign policy emphasized their dissatisfaction with things as they are but did not define substitute policies. The first test of Republican sentiments will be the selection of a new Republican member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Foreign Policy Issues

The election weakens the leadership of the United States in world affairs for a brief period at least, because the future course of the country is in doubt. Neither President Truman nor foreign observers can foretell whether he will be able to carry forward his effort to coalesce the military and economic strength of the North Atlantic area into a compact unit impregnable against the Soviet Union or its allies. Some Republicans who support the North Atlantic program nevertheless recommend that the Administration must urge our allies to show more self-reliance, drop their international political controversies (especially that France give up its objections to the raising of German troops), tighten restrictions on their civilian economies and further limit trade with the Soviet areas.

The Asian nations cannot know whether (if the Chinese armed intervention in North Korea does not degenerate into war) the United States will be able to evolve the policy enunciated by Secretary Acheson on January 12 and encourage the rise of national movements in Asia, or whether we shall treat Asia primarily as a strategic area along the policy lines suggested by General Douglas MacArthur in his letter of last August to the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

Where Asia is concerned disagreement among Republicans almost vanishes. Both those Republicans who support and those who oppose United States policy in Europe have criticized the Truman Administration for not giving effective help to

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Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in the civil war with the Communists. Republicans successfully made an election issue of China in California, Illinois, Ohio and Maryland. Many prominent Republicans propose that the Administration help Chiang retain control of Formosa. Asia may possibly be affected also by the reluctance of many Senators, both Republicans and Democrats, to appropriate more funds for the economic improvement of underdeveloped areas.

How to Renew Bipartisanship

The 1950 election confronts the Administration with greater problems than did the election of 1946, which gave the Republicans control of both House and Senate. In the 80th Congress President Truman and Secretary of State George C. Marshall had the support of Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg. That was the heyday of bipartisanship.

Now, however, the ability of Vandenberg to reassert his former influence with his Republican colleagues in the Senate is questionable because (1) he has been absent on account of illness and (2) Senator Robert A. Taft takes a greater interest in foreign policy than he did during the 80th Congress. Other Republicans on the Foreign Relations Committee who share Vandenberg's conception of policy have not attained his former standing in the party. Moreover, the President's casual attitude toward bipartisanship since the 1948 election, which restored Democratic control of Congress, weakens the effectiveness of any appeal that Republicans might make to their colleagues to go along with the Administration. The presence of John Foster Dulles in the State Department reassures Republicans who share Vandenberg's views that the Administration avoids partisanship in making foreign policy, but many members of the minority party in Congress disagree with Mr. Dulles as well as with Secretary Acheson. Unless Vandenberg resumes his old role, the restoration of bipartisanship probably requires the creation of a working arrangement with Senators who have opposed the Administration's past efforts in the field of foreign affairs.

The most important of these Senators is Taft, whose majority of 450,000 in Ohio establishes him for the present as the leading Republican in Congress. Potentially he has more authority in foreign as well as domestic affairs in the 82nd Congress than Vandenberg had on foreign policy in the 80th Congress, although Taft is not a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Taft's statements during recent months give the impression that his ideas on world affairs are plastic. He recommended the election of a Congress "that will stand up and oppose the spread of communism at home and abroad," but he has questioned the instruments the Administration uses to oppose the spread of pro-Soviet communism in Europe—the Marshall plan and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Although he criticized the Administration for not halting the spread of Soviet influence in Asia, he expressed doubt that the United States should have entered the Korean war. He announced on June 14 that he supported the statement adopted by the Republican members of the House and concurred in by the Republican National Committee. "I am sure," Taft told his constituents, "that the Republican party will cooperate with the State Department in support of these policies directed toward the attainment of peace, subject always to the overriding necessity of maintaining the freedom and security of the people of the United States." Until President Truman and Senator Taft decide whether they can reconcile their foreign policy views, the world will remain in doubt as to the meaning of the elections.

BLAIR BOLLES

Impact of 1947 Partition Darkens India's Outlook

LUCKNOW—In contrast to Pakistan, where the Kashmir dispute monopolizes newspaper headlines and private discussions, India is so deeply preoccupied with internal political and economic problems that even in Lucknow, itself an ancient center of Muslim learning, Kashmir appears to be distinctly on the periphery of public interest. From the point of view of the Indians two issues are of paramount importance in the conflict over Kashmir, as Prime Minister Jawarharlal Nehru stated in his extended New Delhi press conference of September 30.

First of all—and this point was forcibly reiterated by Pandit Nehru to this writer on the opening day of the eleventh conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations—India has not recognized the principle of partition on religious lines; all it has done is to accept, with deep regret, the fact of partition. Therefore, says Nehru, it cannot accept such partition for Kashmir, and whatever settlement is reached with Pakistan must be made on political and economic, not religious, grounds.

Second, the Indians are at one in thinking that Pakistan committed an act of aggression in Kashmir. Therefore, they contend, irrespective of the ultimate steps that might be taken to settle the dispute, it is a dereliction of duty on the part of the United Nations Security Council not to pronounce Pakistan the aggressor—especially in view of the swift decision taken by the Council in the case of the North Koreans. No matter how much India and Pakistan may differ on other matters, they are united in declaring that the Security Council must not be allowed to evade responsibility for acting on the Kashmir issue and are convinced that the Council's three-year delay in arriving at a conclusion is due to Washington's desire to win the support of India (or Pakistan) in the "cold war" with the U.S.S.R.

India-Pakistan Conflicts

Responsible Indians are aware that in a plebiscite held under fair conditions the Muslims, who form a majority of Kashmir's population, would vote for accession to Pakistan, in spite of the fact that Sheikh Abdullah, a Muslim who led the nationalist movement in Kashmir before partition and is an old friend of Nehru, now governs the disputed area. Only in Jammu, where the Hindus are in a majority, can India hope to receive a favorable vote. As long as Abdullah remains in control, however, the Pakistanis do not feel that a plebiscite can be held under conditions that would insure free expression of opinion.

Nehru, for his part, is unwilling to agree to the withdrawal of Abdullah, on the ground, which he restated at New Delhi, that it is India's legal as well as moral duty "to protect the people of Kashmir and give them security." Meanwhile, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, opening a debate in Parliament on October 5 concerning Sir Owen Dixon's report, declared that the continued deadlock over Kashmir imperils peace in Asia and has struck at the root of Indo-Pakistan friendship.

If Kashmir were the only issue at stake between India and Pakistan, it is conceivable that through the exercise of re-

straint on both sides a compromise providing for partition of the disputed area might be arrived at without too much friction. The two nations, however, have yet to settle the thorny question of how each will compensate the other for property left behind by their respective evacuees and have been unable to come to terms on renewal of a trade agreement. The controversy over trade, which has a far-reaching impact on the economies of the two countries, was brought to a head by Pakistan's decision not to devalue its rupee in 1949—a policy to which the International Monetary Fund at its annual meeting in Paris in September took no exception. Since India devalued in 1949, simultaneously with Britain and other Commonwealth countries, it now finds that it has to pay high prices for such essential imports from Pakistan as jute and cotton, traditionally supplied by that area to India's mills. The New Delhi government has gone to great lengths to put pressure on Pakistan, for example by refusing to buy Pakistani cotton last year and, instead, spending hard-to-get dollars on cotton imported from the United States—so far without causing any change of currency policy in Karachi.

Scars of Partition

Overshadowing the whole range of India-Pakistan controversies is the fundamentally different attitude of the two countries toward partition. For the Muslim League, which under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan struggled for many years to win an independent position for the Muslims of India, partition came as a fervently desired but nevertheless unexpected climax to their aspirations. For the Congress party, which had hoped that a united India would emerge from the battle Hindus and Muslims had waged together against British rule, partition brought a profound disillusionment whose scars are far from healed. In the perspective of history Nehru's greatest contribution may prove to be his firm resistance to communal strife. In this respect he has applied, under circumstances that would try the stoutest heart, the philosophy of Gandhi, himself a victim of extremist Hindu elements who resented the Mahatma's efforts to bring about reconciliation of the Muslims and Hindus in truncated India.

A Hindu State?

These extremist elements now claim to have the sympathy of Purushottamdas Tandon, who was elected president of the Congress party at the Nasik conference in September. Tandon, who has a faintly Tolstoyan air, when interviewed in Lucknow, his home town, vigorously denied that he favors accentuation of the division between Hindus and Muslims. What he proposes is the acceptance of the Hindu language and of Hindu culture as the prevailing pattern in India, without encroachment on religious beliefs. Many Indians, however, fear that emphasis on Hindu culture would inevitably lead to repression of the 35 million Muslims left in India. It is interesting that Asoka Mehta, secretary of the Socialist party from Bombay, a leader with burning eyes in a striking bearded face, agrees on the need for a common language in India (only 8 to 10 per cent of the population speak English) but advocates the introduction of Hindustani, which combines Hindi and Urdu, thereby trying to bridge the gap that might otherwise develop between Hindus and Muslims (Urdu is the widespread vernacular language in Pakistan).

Because of the tension over communal issues, any concession to Pakistan would be regarded here as a defeat for India; and Tandon has already called for a "firmer" policy toward Karachi than that followed by Nehru, regarded by him as too lenient. When Nehru, with a rosebud tucked into a buttonhole of his knee-length cream-colored jacket, his face shadowed by weariness, spoke to the Institute of Pacific Relations conference on October 3 of "Asia in torment," some of his listeners felt that he himself was in torment about the soul-searching problems which India faces now that it is no longer buoyed up by the struggle for independence. Some of these problems will be discussed in a subsequent article.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The third of a series of articles on current Asian problems.)

Can Assembly Reform Curb Aggression?

The intervention of the Chinese Communists in the Korean war has raised the spectre of World War III with shocking vividness. Together with Peiping's decision to take over Tibet, Yugoslavia's trepidation regarding possible attacks from neighboring Cominform countries, renewed tension in Palestine focusing on the tragic refugee problem, and uneasiness in Germany, the developments in northern Korea have aroused general interest in the peace-preserving potentialities of the United Nations.

Uniting for Peace

An attempt to make these potentialities operative whenever an emergency arises has taken form in the resolution, "Uniting for Peace"—adopted by the General Assembly on November 3—which has already been hailed as the most important step taken by the UN since its inception. The heart of the resolution is Secretary of State Dean Acheson's proposal for utilizing the General Assembly as a bulwark for peace whenever the Security Council is stymied by the veto.

Under this resolution the General Assembly may be convened on 24-hour notice to consider any "threat to the peace" concerning which action by the Security Council is blocked. A Peace Observation Commission is set up to make field investigations. Member states are asked to designate elements in its national armed forces for UN service. A Collective Measures Committee is established to report by September 1, 1951 on means of strengthening international security.

Another resolution adopted simultaneously calls on the Big Five to attempt through direct negotiation to resolve fundamental differences. In order to decide when aggression has been committed, the Assembly's Political Committee on November 9 adopted a Yugoslav-sponsored resolution which would call on parties to an armed conflict to declare within 24 hours their willingness to discontinue hostilities provided the other party would do the same.

Significant as these resolutions are, their effectiveness requires careful evaluation. The Soviet Union contends that the Acheson plan is illegal since it by-passes the Security Council and undermines the unanimity requirement of the Charter. Without discussing the legal aspects of this question—although the plan clearly entails a basic revision of the original conception of the General Assembly's function—some important practical implications may be considered.

For example, should the United States, counting on substantial support in the General Assembly, become unwilling to

make adjustments to the Soviet point of view, the sharpness of international tensions may well be increased. One virtue of the unanimity rule is that it provides an incentive for the major powers to seek a reconciliation of their views.

Enforcement of any Assembly resolution, once adopted, will depend largely on the willingness of members to furnish military forces, a factor chiefly determined by the attitudes of the United States, the Soviet Union and a few other UN members. Should the majority—including such sizable blocs as the Latin American and Arab states—vote for a police action despite the opposition of the great powers, what is likely to be the consequence? Could enforcement be effective and could the United States Congress be induced to support a military action contrary to this country's foreign policy?

The Risks Involved

In many cases the danger of war arises from controversies not directly related to American-Soviet rivalry. The Palestine, Kashmir and Indonesian disputes, for example, have caught the United States between incompatible interests, with Washington seeking to retain the friendship of both parties to each controversy. In such cases the votes of the non-Soviet world have often been split, and it was not the Russian veto then which prevented effective action. The inability of the General Assembly, as well as of the Security Council, to provide strong leadership in dealing with these problems weakens the Western world and affords an opportunity for communism to expand its international influence.

In other cases where a dispute directly reflects the East-West struggle, however, a different danger arises. The military strength of the Soviet bloc is such that even though a General Assembly decision might be reached by a 55-5 vote, enforcement action could result, not in a limited engagement, like that in Korea, but rather in a direct conflict with the Soviet Union itself. Such a struggle would not be an international enforcement action. It would become instead the dreaded World War III.

Even where aggression is clearly demonstrated to everyone's satisfaction and no veto power can block action, the nations of the world may be reluctant to adopt a resolution that could lead to a major war. Such is the present position regarding Chinese intervention in Korea. The Security Council temporized by deciding on November 8 to invite the Peiping regime to send spokesmen to Lake Success. A resolution presented to the Council on November 10 by the United States and five other countries calls on the Chinese to withdraw from Korea but also reassures Peiping that once Korea has been united UN troops will be withdrawn, that no UN forces will cross into Chinese territory and that existing Chinese rights in Korea—notably the use of hydroelectric power—will be respected.

It would appear that the decision regarding Korea was exceptional not solely because the Soviet Union did not vote. It was also unique because the United States was willing to apply military sanctions and because there was a good prospect that the action could be localized. These conditions do not or may not exist, however, as regards Tibet, Indo-China, Palestine or Germany, and perhaps not even as regards Yugoslavia. The obstacle to peace enforcement, therefore, is not solely or even chiefly the Soviet veto. Although it is all to the good that the powers of the General Assembly should be strengthened, the road to peace still appears to require precarious, protracted and arduous negotiation, compromise and balancing of power as well as long-range economic and social construction.

FRED W. RIGGS

Branch and Affiliate Meetings

NEW YORK, November 20, *The U.S., the UN and the Road Out of Colonialism*, John Sherman Cooper

MILWAUKEE, November 24, *Anglo-American Relations*, Paul Gore-Booth

PHILADELPHIA, November 24, Luncheon Discussion, Philip C. Jessup

POUGHKEEPSIE, November 25, *The UN as a Power for Peace*, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt

DETROIT, November 28, *Canadian Policies in World Affairs*, John Marshall

PITTSBURGH, November 28, *A Report on Europe and Asia*, Paul Anderson, William Block

COLUMBUS, November 29, *Labor and Foreign Policy*, Michael Ross

DETROIT, November 29, *Point Four*, Blair Moody

ST. PAUL, November 29, *What Does Asia Want?*, at Unity Church. *The German Looks at Europe*, at Macalester College Little Theatre. *The German Looks at Europe*, at St. Anthony Park Library

News in the Making

MORE U.S. ECONOMIC AID?: The report on foreign economic policy issued on November 12 by the committee working under Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President, stresses the unity of the economic, political, informational and military aspects of foreign policy and urges the continuation of aid to Western Europe for three or four more years, although on a reduced scale. The report also asserts that the welfare of all nations would be enhanced if this country adopted a more vigorous Point Four program.

YUGOSLAVIA IN STRAITS: The worst drought in Yugoslavia's modern history and fear of an attack by one or more of its neighbors patterned on the North Korean invasion have caused Belgrade to turn increasingly to the West and to the United Nations for aid. President Truman is expected to propose a loan to Belgrade during the coming lame-duck session of Congress. Yugoslavia, meanwhile, has ended direct diplomatic relations with Albania and may move to resolve its difficulties with Greece.

A EUROPEAN DEFENSE FORCE: The Council of Deputies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in London on November 13 to take up again the question of Western Germany's role in an integrated European defense force. President Truman's warm support of the Schuman plan in his St. Louis speech on November 6 was one indication of American efforts to conciliate France and find a formula for bringing German troops into the plan other than by piecemeal.

A GERMAN PEACE TREATY?: Meanwhile, cautious preliminaries to the possible negotiation of a German peace treaty are being considered by the Western powers in the wake of the Soviet bloc's statement of October 21 calling for the disarmament and unification of Germany and the withdrawal of occupation troops one year later. Secretary of State Dean Acheson on November 8 said the United States was giving "careful consideration" to a Russian proposal for a Big Four meeting on the subject but called for a demonstration of a "genuine desire" for peace on the part of the Soviet Union.

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